The extensive collapse of the Syrian Army in the face of opposition factions’ assault raised significant questions, especially with their reach to Homs province just 9 days after the fighting began, following the capture of Aleppo in the first two days of clashes that broke out on November 27, 2024.
Notably, the fierce confrontations between the two sides were confined to Hama province, particularly around the city gate, which is surrounded by the Zain al-Abidin barracks, Hama military airport, and the leadership of the 25th division led by Brigadier General Suhail al-Hassan. Despite the brutal fighting, the opposition factions managed to seize Hama city in just about 72 hours.
Army Confusion Due to the Russian Stance
According to Syrian diplomats in contact with the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Syrian government directly communicated with the Russian Foreign Ministry after the opposition's assault to gauge Moscow's position regarding the attack. However, they received an ambiguous response stating that the assault would not expand beyond restoring areas that were under opposition control before May 2019, which are known as the borders of the fifth zone of the de-escalation agreement. This led to confusion in the field because the military formations loyal to the regime sensed a lack of sufficient air cover from Russian air support.
Sources in the military operations management overseeing the opposition's attack confirmed that they intercepted communications between Syrian army commanders during the battles around Aleppo, in which they stated that Russia was approving the loss of areas and that the Khmeimim base was not striking all the targets it was informed about. They mentioned that Russian air sorties were limited, which prompted the call for the participation of Syrian aircraft, most of which were older models.
War correspondents accompanying the opposition forces to cover the battles noted clear tactical and human differences between the opposition factions and the army, which resulted in a significant field superiority.
According to sources, the joint operations management was able, days before the clashes began, to bribe military units stationed around Aleppo, facilitating the infiltration of sleeper cells. These cells managed to target the operations room overseen by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard at the Iranian consulate in Aleppo, resulting in the death of Iranian General Kiumars Bor Hamashi, described as the commander of the Revolutionary Guard advisors operating in northwestern Syria.
The superiority of the opposition factions in terms of human resources was also evident, as these factions managed to recruit thousands of young fighters under the age of 24 in recent years and trained them for special operations based on infiltration and close-quarters combat. In contrast, most of the Syrian army forces deployed around Aleppo and Idlib province were older, with many having joined military formations after being called up for reserve duty, resulting in a limited understanding of warfare tactics. Hundreds of them were captured after surrendering.
The attacking forces successfully utilized locally-made drones of the "Shaheen" model, which had a significant impact on disrupting the government forces' supply lines and targeting armored vehicles from above. This negatively affected the morale of the Syrian army.
The process of developing these drones took about 3 years, with specialized engineers contributing to their advancement, enabling Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to benefit from their capabilities in manufacturing processes.
According to the military correspondents we spoke to, the military groups affiliated with the opposition factions were distinguished by their ability to conduct reconnaissance and use signaling systems, which enabled them to attack in small, specialized, and mobile groups. This contributed to the collapse of the primary defensive lines, revealing that the army's forces had not established solid defense lines behind the first line.
A clear change in the military approach of the opposition factions was evident as they executed flanking operations and encircled significant military sites that had strong fortifications and firepower. They then isolated these sites from their surroundings, forcing them to negotiate surrender or to invade them after cutting off their supply lines. This strategy was employed in capturing the military academy and the artillery school west of Aleppo, as well as the military barracks in Mount Zain al-Abidin near Hama, which fought fiercely despite being besieged; however, the forces affiliated with the Syrian government eventually abandoned it after becoming disheartened by the supply cuts.
Absence of Iranian-Supported Factions
The absence of Iranian-supported factions was clearly felt in the confrontation. Hezbollah was notably absent due to the significant shocks it sustained in confrontations with Israel, the loss of its effective leadership, and its fears regarding the political repercussions of returning and engaging heavily in the Syrian arena.
On the other hand, Iraqi security sources confirmed to Al Jazeera that the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq sent only a few hundred fighters to support the Syrian army. This was due to the Iraqi government's resistance to involving Iraq in the confrontation in Syria, as it received American warnings several months ago against the continuation of PMF activities outside Iraqi borders and the potential repercussions of this on Iraq.
Information suggests that the Iraqi factions also wish to safeguard their future within the Iraqi landscape, and prefer to distance themselves from playing roles in favor of Iran in the regional arena. They want to reassure neighboring countries that they are heading towards opening a new page, with the exception of the Iraqi Hezbollah, which still shows responsiveness to Iran’s demands regarding support for the Syrian government but in a limited manner, due to the surveillance of borders by American bases deployed along the Syrian-Iraqi border.
The lack of active participation from Iranian-backed factions deprived the Syrian army of the advantage of utilizing trained forces for urban warfare, in addition to losing the ability to use drones that these factions possess and deploy extensively for reconnaissance and attack.
Using the Neutralization Approach
Reports indicate that the management of military operations largely employed a "neutralization" approach, communicating with military groups in western Aleppo around the city and convincing them to neutralize themselves to open gaps. The administration also negotiated with local groups in Salamiyah and Muhardah in the Hama countryside, convincing them not to engage, while assuring them that the attack is not sectarian but specifically targets the forces affiliated with the Syrian regime. They are attempting to do the same with local military groups in Masyaf in the Hama countryside.
This approach facilitated the attacking forces' control over many towns and cities without fighting, which reinforced the impression that there were political understandings leading to the fall of areas, increasing the sense of unrest among the Syrian army’s forces.
Source: Al Jazeera
